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Summary findings
A policv of national exhaustion says that rights to control  Maskus and Chen advance a new model that analyzes
distribution end upon first sale only within a country,  parallel imports as a response to vertical pricing
thereby permitting rights holders to exclude parallel  arrangements between a rights holder ("manufacturer")
imports. A policy of international exhaustion states that  and a foreign distributor. In this model, if markets were
such rights end upon first sale anywhere and therefore  segmented, the manufacturer would charge a wholesale
permits parallel imports. The European Union has a  price to its foreign distributor to ensure an efficient
policy of regional  exhaustion within its territory.  (profit-maximizing) retail price. But if markets were
Language in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  integrated by parallel trade, the distributor could
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)  suggests that this  purchase the good at a wholesale price and sell it back to
policy choice remains the prerogative of individual  the manufacturer's home market at the local retail price.
cout tries.  If transport costs were low enough, this would be
Maskus and Chen review the international policy  profitable, but would diminish the return to the
debate about parallel imports, which are controversial  manufacturer and waste resources in costly trade.
because they erode the ability of intellectual property  So there would be tradeoffs: Parallel imports would
owners to segment markets. Against considerable  benefit consumers in the high-price country but hurt
opposition, for example, Australia recently deregulated  consumers in the low-price country. Such trade forces
its import controls in major copyrighted goods because  the manufacturer to set an inefficient wholesale price to
domestic prices were evidently sustained at high levels by  limit its extent; it also consumes resources.
those controls. Both the European Union and the United  The welfare implications of allowing parallel imports
States are considering permitting parallel imports of  are ambiguous. If the costs of engaging in such trade
prescription pharmaceuticals from abroad.  were low, there would be gains from permitting it; if the
Developing countries must consider their exhaustion  costs were high, it would be more sensible to ban it.
regimes in the context of competition policies and  Countries near each other, with low trade barriers, might
intellectual property rights.  prefer an open regime of parallel trade.
Economic theory demonstrates that the welfare  The vertical pricing model provides an explanation of
tradeoffs in regulating parallel imports are complex and  this pricing behavior that is consistent with
depend on circumstances.  manufacturers' preferences to deter parallel trade.
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Parallel  imports  are genuine products  brought  into a  country without  the  autho-
rization  of a copyright,  patent,  or trademark  owner.  Countries  vary  considerably  in
their  legal treatment  of parallel imports,  as determined  by their choice of exhaustion
doctrine.  A policy  of national  exhaustion  says that  rights  to  control  distribution
end  upon  first  sale only within  a  country,  thereby  permitting  rights  holders  to  ex-
clude  parallel  imports.  A policy of international  exhaustion  states  that  such rights
end  upon  first sale anywhere and therefore  permits  parallel  imports.  The European
Union has a policy of regional exhaustion within its territory.  Language in the TRIPS
agreement  of the  World Trade Organization  suggests that  this  policy choice remains
the prerogative  of individual countries.
We review the international  policy debate  about  parallel  imports,  which  are con-
troversial  because  they  erode the ability  of intellectual  property  owners to  segment
markets.  For example, over considerable opposition Australia  recently deregulated  its
import  controls in major  copyrighted  goods because  domestic  prices were evidently
sustained  at high levels by those controls.  Both  the European  Union and the United
States  are  considering  permitting  parallel  imports  of prescription  pharmaceuticals
from abroad.  Developing countries  need to consider their  exhaustion  regimes in the
context  of competition  policies and intellectual  property  rights.
Economic theory  demonstrates  that  the welfare tradeoffs in regulating  parallel im-
ports  are complex and  dependent  on circumstances.  We advance  a new model that
analyzes  parallel  imports  as a response  to  vertical  pricing  arrangements  between  a
rights  holder  ("manufacturer")  and  a foreign distributor.  In this  model,  if marketswere segmented  the  manufacturer  would charge  a wholesale price to  its foreign dis-
tributor  to  ensure  an efficient (profit-maximizing)  retail  price.  But  if markets  were
integrated  by parallel  trade,  the  distributor  could purchase the  good at a wholesale
price and  sell it back to  the manufacturer's  home market  at  the local retail  price.  If
transport  costs were sufficiently low, this activity would be profitable, though it would
diminish  the return  to the manufacturer  and waste resources  in costly trade.  There-
fore, a series of tradeoffs would exist.  Parallel imports  are beneficial to  consumers in
the  high-price  country  but  detrimental  to  consumers in the  low-price country.  Such
trade  forces the manufacturer  to set an inefficient wholesale price in order to limit its
extent  and  also consumes real resources.
Overall, welfare implications  of allowing parallel imports  are ambiguous. However,
we point  out  that  if costs of engaging in such trade  are low, there  would be gains to
permitting  it while if such costs are high it would be  more sensible to ban  it.  Thus,
while no  single policy prescription  may be  made,  it  seems that  countries  with  low
trade  barriers  and  in close proximity  to  one another  would prefer an open  regime of
parallel  trade.
We perform  an  econometric  test  of the  model  by relating  U.S.  export  prices  at
the  wholesale level across foreign markets to  the costs of shipping  goods back to the
United  States.  It is found that  U.S. import tariffs have the predicted  U-shaped impact
on export wholesale prices.  Thus, the vertical-pricing  model provides  an explanation
for this  pricing  behavior  that  is consistent  with  manufacturer's  preferences to  deter
parallel  trade.1.  Introduction
Parallel  imports  are goods  brought  into  a country  without  the  authorization  of
the  patent,  copyright,  or trademark  owner, after those  goods have been placed  into
circulation  legitimately  in another  market  by the rights-owner  or her authorized  dis-
tributor.  For example, suppose that  an Indonesian authorized  dealer of compact disks
produced  under license to Sony sells them locally at a wholesale price below the retail
price prevailing  in Australia.  If allowed to  do so, the dealer  or an independent  par-
allel trader  could then  ship the  compact disks to  Australia  and make a profit net  of
tariffs and shipping and distribution  costs. Because the goods are originally produced
and  sold under  authorization,  they  are legitimate  copies rather  than  pirated  copies
or knock-offs.  Accordingly, parallel  imports  are identical  to  legitimate  goods,  save
for the  fact  that  they  may be  packaged  differently and  may not  carry  the  original
manufacturer's  warranty.
Parallel  imports  generally  are  not  recorded,  so there  is uncertainty  about  how
significant  they  are.  As  we discuss later,  survey  evidence  suggests  that  they  can
capture  a consequential  share  of markets  for specific products  where  such  trade  is
permitted.  A prominent  example of parallel  trade  came to  light  in July,  1999 when
concerns arose  in  Europe  about  the  safety of Coca-Cola  products.  The  Coca-Cola
company  provides  exclusive licenses to  bottlers  in specific areas of Europe  and  the
licensees are  not  supposed  to  sell outside  those  areas.  Nevertheless,  international
differences in wholesale prices are sufficiently large that  parallel trade  in bottled  soft
drinks  is common.  It  is estimated  that  up  to  20% of the  market  for Coca-Cola  in
the  United  Kingdom  is served by parallel  imports  coming from wholesalers in other
European  nations.1
'See "Coke's Public-Relations Trouble Was Worsened  by Gray Trade," The Wall Street Journal,
July 6, 1999.
4A country's  policy regarding  parallel imports  stems  from  its  specification  of the
territorial  exhaustion  of intellectual  property  rights  (IPRS).  Under  the  doctrine  of
national exhaustion,  rights are exhausted  upon first sale within a nation  but the abil-
ity of IPRS owners to prevent parallel trade between countries remains intact.  Under
the doctrine of international  exhaustion, rights are ended upon first sale anywhere and
parallel  imports  are permitted.  An intermediate  policy is to  adopt  regional exhaus-
tion,  in which rights  are exhausted  within  a group  of countries,  thereby  permitting
parallel trade  among them,  but  are not exhausted  outside the region.
The treatment  of exhaustion is a core component of a nation's  protection  for, and
regulation of, intellectual  property rights.  Because IPRS  are provided on a territorial
or  national  basis,  the  global  approach  to  date  has  been to  permit  each nation  to
establish  its  own policy covering parallel  imports.  Indeed,  despite  attempts  by the
American  negotiators  in  the  Uruguay  Round  to  incorporate  a  global standard  of
national  exhaustion  into  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of Intellectual
Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  no such consensus could be  developed.  Rather,  Article  6
of TRIPS  states  that:
For the purposes  of dispute settlement  under  this Agreement,  subject  to
the provisions of Articles 3 and 4, nothing in this Agreement shall be used
to address  the issue of the exhaustion  of intellectual  property  rights.
(Article  3 is a national  treatment  obligation  and Article  4 is a MFN  obligation.)
Thus,  a compromise was reached to preserve the status  quo ante on parallel importa-
tion.  This compromise was important  to secure the adherence to TRIPS of numerous
developing countries, which reserve the right to set individual policies on exhaustion.
However, TRIPS  itself is subject  to reform in the year 2000 (Maskus,  1998), raising
the  possibility of this issue being re-visited.  Moreover, in laying the groundwork for
the new Millenium Round of trade  negotiations, U.S. trade authorities  have advanced
5the  notion  of a global rule of national  exhaustion,  or elimination  of parallel  trade.
Thus,  it is an important  issue for analysis.
The  economic literature  on parallel imports  is limited.  The  only formal analysis
treats  parallel  trade  as  a  mechanism for defeating  international  third-degree  price
discrimination,  with ambiguous welfare impacts  (Malueg and  Schwartz, 1994). Less
formal literature  discusses the problems that  emerge when parallel traders free ride on
the marketing  and service investments of authorized distributors  (Chard  and Mellor,
1989; Barfield and Groombridge, 1998). While these issues are important,  the litera-
ture has ignored a third  point, which is that  parallel  imports may arise endogenously
as a result  of efforts by IPRS  owners to exert  vertical price control  in unsegmented
markets.  In this paper, we shall focus on this point and argue that  the issue of paral-
lel imports can, to a certain extent,  be viewed and understood  as an issue of vertical
price control.
The basic logic behind  our theory of parallel trade  is simple and  can be stated  as
follows. When  a manufacturer  sells its product  through  an  agent  (distributor)  in a
certain  country, the  manufacturer  has the  incentive to  charge the  agent a wholesale
price that  is sufficiently low in order to induce a desirable retail price on that  market,
provided that  the manufacturer  cannot directly set  the retail  price.  This  creates  an
opportunity  for the agent to sell the product  profitably  in another country, either by
the  agent himself or through  a third  party, without  the  authorization  of the  manu-
facturer.  We explore this  simple logic of parallel trade  in a two-country  model, and
show how in equilibrium  the  manufacturer  balances  the tradeoff  between achieving
efficient vertical  pricing and preventing parallel importing.  Without  legal restriction
on parallel  importing,  the  combined social surplus  in two  countries  first  decreases
and then increases in the private cost of engaging in parallel importing.2 Restricting
2Interestingly, this U-shaped welfare  curve is similar to that  in Brander and Krugman (1983),
although the models and the contexts are very different.
6parallel  imports  always benefits the manufacturer,  but  it may either  raise or reduce
the  combined social surplus in two countries.
There are several reasons why we believe that  it is important  to study  the problem
of parallel imports  from the perspective  of vertical  price control. 3 First,  typically  a
parallel  trader  either  is an  authorized  wholesaler himself or obtains  the  good from
an  authorized  wholesaler.  Thus,  it is the wholesale price, not  the retail  price, that
determines  the profitability  of parallel  trade.  The formation  of prices in the vertical
relationship  could thus be crucial for our understanding  of parallel imports.  Second,
while the explanation  of parallel imports based on service free-riding may well be im-
portant  for some goods, many products  are parallel- traded  for which this explanation
does not seem satisfactory,  including footwear, clothing, soft drinks, and construction
equipment.  Third,  our analysis offers new and  interesting  insights  about  the  policy
debate  on parallel  imports.  In particular,  we find that  there  is an  important  rela-
tionship  between declining trade  costs (say through  trade  liberalization)  and parallel
imports, with  the latter  more likely contributing  positively to  global surplus as trade
costs are reduced.
The  prevention  of parallel imports  is essentially the  enforcement  of an  exclusive
territory  for a manufacturer  or rights  holder in the  international  context.  As such,
our study of parallel imports is closely related to the literature  on vertical restraints.4
While our analysis of parallel trade  (or exclusive national territories)  is rather  different
from existing models in this literature,  it shares some similar  intuition  with a recent
paper  by Chen (1999), which shows how oligopoly price discrimination  by competing
retailers may make it desirable for a manufacturer  to impose resale price maintenance.
The  paper  proceeds  as follows.  In  the  next  section  we discuss the  international
30ur approach, however,  does not exclude other possible  theories of parallel imports. As we shall
discuss later, our model can be easily modified to incorporate price discrimination and/or  service
free riding.
4See, for instance, the survey by Katz (1989).
7policy structure  concerning parallel imports.  In the third  section we develop a simple
model of vertical price control, with and without parallel trade, to highlight important
tradeoffs that  emerge.  In the  fourth  section we present basic and  indirect empirical
evidence on parallel imports, which are not directly measured in general.  Econometric
analysis of detailed  price data  for specific U.S. exports  to various countries provides
support  for the vertical-control  model.  We conclude in the final section.
2.  The  International  Policy  Structure  Regarding  Parallel  Imports
The TRIPS  Agreement  represents the  first significant movement toward  effective
harmonization  of national legislation, going well beyond liberalization  of border mea-
sures.  As such, it was impossible to reach agreement on a number of difficult issues.
The compromise reached in Article 6 of TRIPS reflects a failure to achieve consensus
among competing  economic interests  (Abbott,  1998). Intellectual-property  develop-
ers in the United  States generally preferred a global rule restricting  parallel imports.
The European  Union wished to preserve its internal exhaustion  doctrine.  Developing
countries tended to advocate a global rule of international  exhaustion  and were joined
in this position by certain small, high-income economies including Australia  and New
Zealand.
Considerable debate  has ensued over the wisdom of amending exhaustion in TRIPS
in either  of two polarized directions.  First,  some observers advocate a global ban on
parallel imports  as a natural  extension of the rights of intellectual  property owners to
control international  distribution  (Barfield and  Groombridge,  1998). Second, others
argue for a uniform rule of international  exhaustion, placing no restrictions  on parallel
trade,  as a means of integrating markets and disciplining abusive price discrimination
and  collusion that  may  arise from purely private  contractual  territorial  restraints.
This  view may be nuanced  by recognition of the  need for exemptions  from parallel
imports  in certain  sectors  (Abbott,  1998).
8That  policies differ across countries may be seen from Table 1, which lists the basic
status  of protection  for goods bearing trademarks,  patents,  and copyrights in selected
nations.5 The European  Union follows a policy of exhaustion  in all IPR fields within
the  Community but  bars parallel imports coming from outside its territory.  The Eu-
ropean  Court  of Justice  (ECJ)  has steadfastly  upheld the right to re-sell legitimately
procured  goods within the area as a necessary safeguard for completing the internal
market.  Two important  exceptions  exist.  First,  countries  are allowed to  preclude
parallel imports  in pharmaceutical  goods if it threatens  to  interfere with pricing reg-
ulations.  It  is noteworthy  that  the United Kingdom,  Germany, and Denmark, where
drug  prices are least  controlled and  therefore  highest,  are  open to  parallel  imports
from  other  EU nations.  Second, the  ECJ  affirmed that  first  showing of a theatri-
cal movie or television broadcast  abroad does not exhaust  international  distribution
rights  in  light  of the  need to  exploit  copyright  through  repeated  showings in  this
industry.6(See Table  1.)
American  policy on parallel  imports  is mixed.  Within  the national  economy the
United  States  enforces a  "first-sale doctrine",  by which  rights  are exhausted  when
purchased  outside  the vertical  distribution  chain.  Thus,  U.S. firms cannot  preclude
purchaseis  from re-selling products  anywhere within the United States.  This doctrine
is seen as an important  policing device for exclusive territories,  which are permissible
subject  to a rule-of-reason inquiry. Regarding parallel imports in trademarked  prod-
ucts,  the  United  States  follows a  "common-control exception",  affirmed in  a recent
Supreme Court decision. 7 The principle allows trademark  owners to block parallel im-
ports except when both  the foreign and US trademarks  are owned by the same entiry
or when the foreign and US trademark  owners are in a parent-subsidiary  relationship
'This discussion  covers  the essential  structure  of protection  but there are many  exceptions  and
nuances to each nation's laws.
6Coditel SA v Cine-Vog  Films, Case 62/79. March 18, 1980.
7K Mart Corp. v Cartier, 486 US 281(1987).
9(Palia  and  Keown,  1991; NERA,  1999).  Mloreover,  blocking such imports  requires
demonstrating  that  they  are not  identical  in quality  to  original  products  and  may
cause consumer confusion.  Owners of American patents  are protected  from parallel
imports under  an explicit right of importation.  Finally, copyrighted goods are barred
from parallel importation  by the Copyright Act of 1976. Recent attempts  by produc-
ers of trademarked  goods,  such as shampoo,  to  extend  this  protection  by claiming
copyright  protection  for labels have been turned  away by the  Supreme Court.8
Australia  generally  permits  parallel  imports  in  trademarked  goods  but  permits
patent  owners to restrict them.  Australia removed protection for copyrighted compact
disks in late  1998, complementing  its earlier limited  deregulation  of book  imports.
Japan  allows parallel  imports  in trademarked  and  patented  goods unless they  are
explicitly barred  by contract provisions or the original sale of such goods was subject
to  price regulation  abroad.  Under its  case law, Japan  is substantially  more open to
parallel imports  than  is the United  States  (Abbott,  1998)
Although  not  listed  in  Table  1, few developing countries  have chosen to  restrict
parallel  imports  in any  field of protection.  In some degree this  reflects the  general
absence or limitations  of IPRs and competition  policies. However, parallel imports  are
widely seen as a useful policing device against  price collusion arising from exclusive
territorial  restraints  and  parallel exports  as an  opportunity  for penetrating  foreign
markets.
3.  A  Simple  Model  of Parallel  Imports
There  are two leading theories about  parallel imports,  the international  price dis-
crimination  theory  and the free-riding theory.9 The former does not  incorporate  the
8Quality King Distributors v L'anza Research International, 96-470,  March 1998.
'Another  explanation of parallel imports is international price differences  due to national price
regulations, particularly in the global pharmaceuticals  industry (Danzon, 1997).
10fact  that  typically  a  manufacturer's  good  is sold to  some  intermediate  agents  be-
fore reaching final consumers,  while the latter  does not  explain  goods being parallel
imported  for which  service  externalities  do  not  appear  important.  It  is therefore
important  to have a theory of parallel imports  that  takes into account the vertical re-
lationships  that  often exist in the marketing  of a manufacturer's  good internationally
but  does not  necessarily rely on the presence of service externalities.
In this section we develop a model of a firm that  sells abroad  through  a distributor
(retailer)  and  attempts  to  achieve the  profit-maximizing  retail  price through  setting
its  wholesale price and  license (franchise) fee.  In Subsection  3a we first analyze  the
model under  the  assumption  that  the distributor  is able to  parallel  export  the good
back to the initial  firm's market,  and in Subsection 3b we then  analyze the economic
effects that  result  if such parallel trade  is not  allowed legally.
3a.  Model  Structure
A manufacturer,  M,  sells its  product  in two  countries,  A and  B.  In country  A,
M  sells directly to  the consumers, or sells through  a wholly-owned subsidiary  whose
retail  price is set  by M.  In country  B,  M  sells its  product  through  an  independent
exclusive distributor,  L. The demand  in A is q =  a - p, and  that  in  B  is q =  1 - p.
Hence demand  is higher  (or lower) in  A if a  >  1 (or a  <  1), and  the  two countries
have the  same demand  if a  =  1. Manuacturer  M  has  a  constant  marginal  cost  of
production  c, which is normalized  to zero, and the  retailing  cost in both  countries  is
normalized  to  zero as well.1 0 For convenience, assume  a <  2.
Suppose  that  M  can offer L  any  contract  in  the  form of (w, T),  where  w is the
wholesale price L purchases from M and T is a transfer  payment  (franchise fee) from
L to  M.11 However, M cannot  prevent  L from selling the  product  back to  A, either
10The model can be easily extended to include positive retailing costs in both countries.
"Equivalently, we can think of L being a licensee of M  in country B. In this case T will then
11directly or through  intermediaries.  That  is, either M cannot legally limit L's territory
of sales, or it is too  costly for M to  enforce any such constraint.12 Suppose that  L
incurs an additional  constant  marginal cost g > 0 in selling the good back to A. For
instance,  g could be the additional  transportation  cost or transaction  cost.  Assume
g <  a so that  L's  cost of selling the product  to  A is not too  high. Assume that  if L
sells in Country  A, it will compete with  M in a Cournot  fashion in A.
In  suggesting  the  simple model  above,  great  emphasis  has  been  placed  on  the
model's tractability.  Our purpose is to have a model that  not only captures the basic
tradeoff a manufacturer  faces in achieving optimal vertical pricing and preventing par-
allel importing  when it sells through  an independent  agent, but  also is simple enough
to  allow for explicit  solutions  that  permit  interesting  comparative-statics  analysis.
We note  that  this  model can be  modified readily  to  address  the two other  impor-
tant  explanations  of parallel imports.  For instance,  the possiblity of free-riding by a
parallel  importer  can be  incorporated  into the  model if we assume instead  that  M
also sells in  Country  A through  an independent  distributor  and the market  demand
in  A is given by q  a - p + $(F),  where F  is the promotional  expenditures  of the
distributor  in A and 0(.)  is some known function.  On the other  hand,  if we assume
instead that  the manufacturer  can directly set the retail price in Country  B as well as
in Country  A, then  the model is reduced to one of international  price discrimination.
Our setup  of the  model allows us to  focus on the  issue of parallel  imports  from the
perspective of vertical  price control.
Let  the  quantities  sold in  A by  M and  L  be  qam and  qd,  respectively,  and  the
quantity  sold in B  by L be qb. A subgame-perfect  Nash equilibriumn  is a pair  (qam,rr
qaz)  that  constitute  a Nash equilibrium for any (w, T), together  with an optimal choice
be the license  fee and w the royalty  payment  per unit of output. Contracts  with a fixed  fee and
per-unit  royalty  are common  in international  licensing  (Contractor,  1981).
'However, we assume  that M or any agents  of M other than L will  not sell in B.
12of qb by L for any  (w, T)  and  an optimal  choice of (w, T) by M.
We start  our analysis of the model by considering equilibrium in Country  A, taking
as given any  (w, T)  that  is accepted  by L. The profits  of M  and  L through  sales in
A are:
7Tam  =  qam  [a - (qam + qal) - 0] +  (w  - 0)qa1,  (1)
ral =  qal  [a-(qam  + qao)-w-g]  (2)
The first-order  conditions,  which are also sufficient here, are:
a - 2qam  -qal  =  0,
a - qam  - 2qal  -W  -g  =  0,
provided  a  - 2w  - 2g >  0, or  a-29  > w. 2-
Therefore,  given  any  (w,  T)  that  is accepted  by  L,  there  exists  a  unique  Nash
equilibrium  in A, (qam(w), qal(w)), given by
qam(w)  =  a +w+g  qal(w) =  a  2w2g,  f w  <  a-2g
qa  - 3  1W-  2'
qa.(W)  =  a2;  qal(w)  =  0,  if  2  <  w.  (3) qamk,  ~2  2
The equilibrium  price in Country  A, as a function of w, is
Pa(W) =  a+wg  if  W.< a-2g a  if  a-2g  <W
When  a-2g  >  w
ram(w)  a+w+g  ±g[  (a+w+g  a-2w-2g  )]ff  a-2w-2g 7ra(W)3  L3  3  )  j  w  3
13(a+w+g) 2 a-2w--2g
9  3
a - 2w-2g  a+w+  a-2w-2g  l  (a--2w  - 29)2
7ral  (w)  =  3  La  -(  3  +  3  )u-  =9
The industry profit generated through  sales in Country  A, 7ra(w),  thus  is
7ra  (W)  (a+ W±) 2 a-2w-2g  + (a-2w  29) 2
When  a-2-q <  w, we have
K.am(W) =  7ra(w)  =  a,  7ra(W)  =  O.
4
We next consider output  and price in Country  B, again taking  as given any (w, T)
that  is accepted by L. Distributor  L solves
max {(1  - qb-  w)qb}
qb
The equilibrium  (optimal)  price and  quantity  in B thus are:
pb(W)  =  2  qb(w)  2(5)
Firm  L's  profit in B, excluding T, is  7rb(w)  =  (42.
We now turn  to  the  equilibrium  choice of (w, T)  by  M.  In  equilibrium,  M  can
extract  all the surplus from L by setting
T  =  T(w)  _  7rad(w)  + 1rb(w).
Any contract  (w, T(w))  is accepted by L in equilibrium.  The equilibrium choice of w
therefore  maximizes the joint  industry  profits in two countries,  II(w), and
(a+1_+g)2  a-2w-2g  (a-2w-29)  + ) 2 +  W  1-w  if  W  <  -2
(  )  +  3  +  9  T4  W2  -2
=  a2  +  (W)2  +  W1_W  if  a2  <  W  <
14That  is,
|(a+W+g)2  Wa-2w-2g  +  (a-2w-2g)
2 +  1-W2  if  w  <  a2(
rl(w)  9  3  9  ~~~4  -2(6)
a
2 +  1-W
2 if  a-2g  <  W  <
44  2  <<
We have:
Proposition  1  The model has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  The equi-
librium  value of w, w*, is given by
we48  = if  g  <  13a W*  13  -g>14  (7)
a-2g  if9>34
the  equilibrium price in Country  A is
5a+7g  i'f  g￿<  3a
{a Pa(if  g>=a  (8)
2a  if  9  4a
and the equilibrium price in Country  B is
pb(W)  =  ++gif  g  <  3a
)  +  a-2g  if  g  >  3a
Proof.  For w <  a-2g
l(w>= -(a  + w + g) 2 a-2w-2g  (a-2w-2g) 2 1  W2
9  3  +  9  4
The maximizing w satisfies:
2  a-2w-2g  2  -w4  wa2  -9-2=°
2(a w  g)+  a  2w-  2  - 2w  -- (  a  - 2w  - 2g)  - w- =  0,
9  3  3  9  2




and w* indeed maximizes 11(w) for g <  13a  since in this  case
2a + 8g  a  a-2g  -9a  + 42g<
13  2  26
If g  >  -3  a, then  2a+8g  >  a-2,  and we must  have
14  ~~13  2
*  a-2g
2
since  42  +  2  decreases in w.
4  4
Substituting  w* into pa(w) and pb(W),  we obtain p* and p*.
The uniqueness  of the  equilibrium follows from the uniqueness of w*, pa, and pb
.
Since qal(w*) =  3a-14  >  0 if and only if g  < A3a,  we have
Proposition  2  Parallel importing  occurs in country A  if and only if g <  13a.
When g <  3 a,
*  *  5a+7g  (I  a+4g9  4a+3g  1
Pa  -r  P=  - _  + 
ra rb  ~13  (2  13  13  21
which is positive if a >  J8-  3g  and negative if a < 13 - 3g. We thus  have: 5  4  5  4
Corollary  1  Assume g <  13a.  There is parallel importing from country B  to country
A  in  equilibrium; and prices are higher in A  than in B  if a >  8-4g,  and they are
13  3~~~~~~~~ 
lower in A  than in B  if a <  13-  g.
Figure  1 shows in the  (a-g)-space the relations  between parameter  values, parallel
importing  (PI),  and the price differences in the two countries.  For ease of illustration,
the value of a on the horizontal  axis starts  from 1 and the value of g on the vertical
16axis starts  from 0.  The  area below the line g ==  l3a indicates the  combinations  of a
and g under  which there  will be parallel importing  from B to A. The line g =  13-8a
then  separates  this  area into the region where Pa < pb and the region where Pa > Pb
(See Figure  1.)
Our result  that  parallel imports  can flow from a high-price country to  a low-price
country is in contrast  to the findings in the existing theories of parallel imports.  The
key to the unusual result here is the recognition that  the cost of acquiring the product
to  a parallel trader  need not  be the  market price, but  could instead  be the wholesale
price of the manufacturer.  To induce the profit-maximizing retail price in the country
sold by an independent  agent  (a distributor  or a retailer),  the  manufacturer  desires
to  set the  wholesale price at  its marginal  cost of production.  But  such a  wholesale
price would create an opportunity  for the retailer to engage in parallel trading,  selling
the  product  profitably  in another  country, either  directly or through  intermediaries,
without  the  authorization  of the manufacturer.  Parallel  imports  reduce the  profits
of the manufacturer  (or the joint  industry  profits in two countries),  not  only because
it creates  competition  in the country  receiving parallel  imports,  but  also because  it
incurs additional  transaction  (transportation)  costs and it prevents the manufacturer
from achieving efficient vertical pricing (setting the wholesale price to marginal cost).
When the  manufacturer  is unable  effectively to impose territorial  constraint,  it can
still reduce or eliminate parallel imports by raising the wholesale price to the indepen-
dent  agent, but  this leads to less profitable retail  price in the  country where parallel
imports  originate.  In equilibrium,  the  manufacturer  balances  the needs  to  exercise
optimal  vertical price control and to  limit parallel imports.
When g <  3 a,
(a +  2a+8g  +  g) 2a2a  + Sg a-22±8g  - 2  (a-22a+8g9  2g)2
H(w*)  =  9  13  3  9
17(2a+8g)2  3  2  2  9  2  1
413  =  1a  - -ag  +  -3g  +  -
4  13  13 a  13j~  4~
WhengŽ>  13a,
a2 1-_  (a-2)2  3  i2  1~  1  1  2
[(w*)  ±  +  4  4 + 4ag-_g.
Therefore,  the  equilibrium  combined  industry  profit  in  two  countries,  which  is the
same  as  the  profit  of  the  manufacturer  in  our  model,  is
3  ~a 2 _ 2  9a±-  g2 ±+ 1 if  g￿j3
=  13  _3ag  +  13  4  14a
3 a 2 +  4 +  lag - 1g2 if  3 a  < g
which  is  -3a 2 +  I  when  g-O  and  1 (a2 +  1)  >  3 a2 +  4 when  g  a W 1 3 4 4 1 1 3 4  22
Since
3( a 2 _  ag  +  9 g2 +  l)  2  18
03g  13  13'
which  is  negative  if g  <  la  and  is positive  if g  >  la;  and  since
&0(-la2 +  I  +  lag  - 4  2 )  1  2g  1  4  _  (2() 16  4  4  -- >-
09g  4 ~~4  4  4
we  have
Corollary  2  The  combined  industry  profit  in  two  countries  decreases  in  g  when  g  <
increases  in  g  when  g >  la,  and  it  is  highest  when  g =
It  is  interesting  that  industry  profits  are  not  monotonic  in  g.  An  increase  in  g
reduces  competition  in  A  for  any  given  w,  but  increases  the  cost  of  the  output  sold
back  to  A  by  L.
When  g  <  A3a, the  combined  consumer  surplus  in  two  countries  is
1/ (a~5a+7g)2  1  (1  a+4g)2
2  13  J  2  2-  --  )1
When  g  >  134a, the  combined  consumer  surplus  in  two  countries  is:
181(a)2  +1  (1  a -2g)
Therefore,  combined social surplus in two countries, which we shall also call global
welfare, or simply welfare when there is no confusion, is
3  2  - 2 ag  +  9 92 +1  1 (a  5a+7gq)2  +  1  ( I  a+4g )
2 if  3 a
S*  73  3_  13  4  2  (  -13  I'  2  13  f  <-a4
3a 2 +  I +  Iag  - 192  + 1 (_)2  + 1 (I  _  29)2  if  3a<g
That  is
l a  2  - 6ag  + 2392  + 3-26a-139  if  g  <_  (10)
112T  T3  1  26  1  36  1  4(0
Ila2  + 3 +lag  - 192  -8a±+  4g  if  -la  < g
Since
8("a  2 -_6ag±+ 2g 2 ±  --La  --- 2g)  _  6  23  2
*9_  13  ±13913<0
for all g < -3-a, and
3__2  +_3 +  __  8_+  4__  a  1a-g  +  >  -a  -(-)  +  - > 0, ag  8  4  ±4  8  4 2  4
for all g C ( 3 a, a], we have:
Corollary  3  Combined social surplus S* decreases in g if g <  3 a, and increases in
g  if g  >  3 a.
Thus,  there  is a  U-shaped  welfare curve with  respect  to  the  cost  of engaging  in
parallel importing.  This finding connects nicely to the result  in Brander  and  Krug-
man (1983). They present a model of reciprocal dumping of homogenous goods with
symmetric  duopolists.  However, they  do not  consider vertical  relationships  in  dis-
tribution.  They  find  a  similar  U-shaped  welfare curve stemming  from  a  tradeoff
19between  resource waste  in cross-hauling and procompetitive  pricing.  It  is interest-
ing  that  welfare in  our  model is associated  with  trade  costs in  a  similar  way but
under  a very  different context.  Our model incorporates  these two effects, but  adds
a tradeoff between efficient vertical pricing and parallel trade.  Without  parallel  im-
ports,  the  wholesale price would equal true  marginal  cost of supplying  the good to
the distributor.  Parallel  imports  force the manufacturer  to  raise the wholesale price
above marginal cost,  which creates  a distortion  in the vertical  pricing scheme. This
adds additional  cost to cross-hauling costs and both  must be compared  to gains from
reducing consumer price in the importing  country.
To see the  intuition  of why global surplus can increase in cost g, notice that  when
g  >  13a, M  will set  w high enough so that  it is not  profitable for L to  sell back.  A
higher g will enable  M to set a lower w to achieve this  objective.  In turn,a  lower w
reduces the price distortion  in market  B and thus  increases social surplus.
Thus,  if there  is  parallel  trade  in  equilibrium,  then  a  reduction  in  the  cost  of
conducting  parallel  trade  increases  social welfare.  On the  other  hand,  if parallel
trade  is currently  being deterred  by the manufacturer  throught  its choice of vertical
pricing, then  a reduction  in the  cost of conducting  parallel trade  actually  decreases
social welfare. To the extent  that  the cost of conducting parallel trade  is affected by
government regulations  and trade policies, our result suggests that  an optimal policy
is one that  either  reduces g as much as possible or raises g as much as possible, but
not  to leave g at some intermediate  value.
3b.  The  Effects  of  Restricting  Parallel  Imports
If L  is prevented  from selling the  product  back to  A, either  because  there  exists
effective vertical  restraint  imposed by M or because parallel  imports  are not  legally
allowed, then  again with  a contract  (w, T),  and denoting equilibrium  (optimal)  vari-
ables by adding superscript  "V", it is optimal for M to set:
20WV =  c =  O,and Tv =  7Tb
Prices in A and B will then be
Pa =-  Pb  1  (11)
Since,  when  there  is parallel  importing,  Pa =5a+7  < a and  Pb =  2 +  2+49 >  2,  we
have
Proposition  3  Restricting parallel imports raises prices in the country receiving par-
allel imports  and reduces prices  in  the country where parallel imports  originate.  In
other words, restricting parallel imports hurts consumers in the country receiving par-
allel imports but benefits consumers in the country where parallel imports originate.
Combined industry  profit in the two countries will be
1  2  (a  (12)
4
Since  [I* <  ' (a 2 + 1). for g <  ',  the  manufacturer  always  benefits  if parallel  imports
are prohibited.
The combined social surplus in two countries if parallel imports  are not  allowed is
S  1 (a)  2  +  1  +(a2  ±1)  =  3(a2  +  1).  (13)
The change in social surplus due to  restricting  parallel imports  is
f  _  a2+  6ag_  23g2+  la+  2  if  g <  3  i
AS  -=  S'  --  S.  104  13  26  26  13  -14
1  32(a-2g+4)(a-2g)  if  g >  13 a
We have:
Proposition  4  Restricting parallel imports may  either increase or reduce combined
social surplus  in  two countries.  For any given a >  4,  there exists a unique number
21g(a) E (0,  3 a] such that restricting parallel imports reduces social surplus if g < g(a)
and increases social surplus if g > g(a).  If g >  13a,  then restricting parallel imports
always increases combined social surplus.
Proof.  Notice first that  AS  > 0 if g >  3 a.
Next,  since S* =  la 2 +  8-216a  when  g = 0 and S* =  3(a2  +  1) = Sv wheng=  g  ,
and  since
-(a  1)-  a  +  a)  =-  a (5a-4)  > 0 iff a >
8  \.26  826!  104  >>5
we have AS  <0  if g =  0 and  a>  4 5.
But  since S* decreases in g for g < l3a and sv is independent  of g, AS increases in
g for g <  3 a. Therefore,  for any a >  4,  there  must exist a unique g(a)  E (0, 13a]  such
that  AS  < 0 when g < g(a),  AS  = 0 when g = g(a),  and  AS  > 0 when g > g(a).
It  is then  obvious that  restricting  parallel  imports  may either  increase  or reduce
the  combined social surplus in two countries.
U
Whether  parallel importing  should be established  as a global policy is under  debate
in the  WTO.  Our  analysis can  shed light  on this  issue.  Our  finding that  parallel
importing  can increase world welfare in some situations  but  reduce  world welfare in
other  situations  suggests that  neither  a policy that  always bans parallel  trade  nor  a
policy that  always facilitates  it is justified from the perspective of economic efficiency.
Rather,  a  rule of reason  concerning  the  legal status  of parallel  imports  or  vertical
restraints  by  manufacturers  to  prevent  them  seems  ecolnomically warranted.  Our
analysis further  suggests that  policy  choices concerning  parallel  imports  are  closely
related  to  choices on other trade  policies. For instance,  if it is desirable  that  parallel
imports  be legally allowed, then it would also be desirable to reduce any trade  barrier
that  increases the cost of parallel trading.  On the other hand, if the cost of conducting
parallel  imports  is sufficiently high,  part  of which  could be  due  to  the  presence  of
22significant  trade  barriers,  then  it  could be desirable  not  to  allow parallel  imports
legally.
4.  Empirical  Evidence  and  Policy  Implications
Custorns  authorities  do not  collect data  on parallel  imports,  making  systematic
empirical analysis of such trade  flows impossible. We first review survey evidence on
the subject,  noting the multiple causes and some puzzles that  our model can explain.
We then  perform an econometric  analysis of price data  that  is aimed at testing  key
implications  of the model.
4a.  Survey  Evidence  on Parallel  Imports
The limited  evidence available suggests that  there  are multiple  causes of parallel
trade.  Parallel  imports  (or gray-market  imports)  became  an  issue of active policy
concern in the  United  States  around  1984.  Survey evidence reported  rapidly  rising
parallel  import  volumes in  37 product  categories, with  most  being high-end goods
bearing recognized trademarks,  such as Mercedes-Benz sedans,  Opium perfume,  and
Nikon  cameras  (USDOC,  1985).  As Tarr  (1985) and  Hilke (1988) point  out,  this
surge in  parallel imports  corresponded to  a strong  rise in the  real effective value of
the dollar.  Dollar-denominated  U.S. real prices within authorized  distribution  outlets
did not fall in this period (indeed, many rose), suggesting strongly that  foreign manu-
facturers were pricing to  market in dollar terms.  This lagged (or absent) adjustment
to the exchange rate  change posits one primary  determinant  of parallel imports:  in-
ternational  price differences associated with limited international  pass-through  effects
(Feenstra,  1989; Kasa,  1992).
Free-riding behavior was less evident in the 1980s. Only Opium perfume reported
significant parallel  imports prior to the dollar appreciation  and  the rise in its  dollar-
23denominated  marketing costs was far less than  the exchange-rate  change (Tarr, 1985;
Hilke, 1988). Notice that  while many of the parallel imports involve name-brand  con-
sumer  goods for which service and promotional  activities  are likely to be important,
it does not  necessarily mean that  there will be inefficient free riding on these activi-
ties.  For instance,  a manufacturer  may itself engage in the promotional activities  and
internalize their  benefits for all distributors.  Or, a distributor  may be able to charge
for the service it provides and thus  internalize its  benefits.
Parallel imports  attract  attention  in the EU, which maintains  regional exhaustion
and is considering whether to adopt international  exhaustion in trademarks.  A recent
survey  indicates  that  intra-union  parallel  trade  captures  varying  shares of sales in
ten sectors,  as shown in Table 2 (NERA, 1999).'3 Parallel imports  take their largest
shares in compact disks, cosmetics and perfumes, and soft drinks.  Survey respondents
also  predict  modest  rises in  parallel  imports  from outside  the  EU  if international
exhaustion  were adopted,  though  the  increases in market  share  for parallel  traders
in footwear, consumer electronics, and domestic appliances could be significant.  (See
Table 2.)
It  is interesting  that  this  study  identifies as likely sources for rising  parallel  im-
ports  certain  countries  that  may have higher retail prices than  those  in the  EU for
the goods involved. For example, comparing retail prices of specific large-engine pas-
senger vehicles in  1993, we calculate that  the  average Japanese  price exceeded the
average price in the EU by 23 percent.'4 This provides some evidence to support  our
explanation  of parallel  imports  based  on the  problem  of veritcal  price control.  An
important  implication  of our  model is that  parallel  imports  can flow from  a  coun-
try  with  higher retail  prices to  a country  with  lower retail  prices.  This  possibility
" 3This survey garnered an extremely low response rate and numerical evidence presented should
be treated with caution. It seems likely that the true extent of parallel trade is underreported.
14 These computations were made from retail transactions prices listed in the International Com-
parisons Project performed by the United Nations. They were provided to us by the World Bank.
24is mentioned  in the  literature  as well.  Barfield and  Groombridge  (1998) explicitly
mention that  imperfect competition  in distribution  could be consistent  with parallel
imports  coming from high-price markets.  Further,  a survey of US exporters to  Asia
in 1989 indicated  that  some distributor  agents experienced competition  from US sup-
pliers, which may have sold products  on the American market  at higher retail prices
than  those  commanded  in Asia  (Palia  and  Keown, 1991).  Finally,  respondents  to
the NERA (1999) survey identified ex-factory (eg, wholesale) price differences across
markets  as a major determinant  of parallel trade.
4b.  Econometric  Analysis  of International  Prices
We wish to provide meaningful econometric analysis of our vertical-pricing model.
Although  we do not  have data  on quantities  of parallel imports,  we nevertheless  can
use regression analysis of international  wholesale prices to test  indirectly the model's
implications.  In particular,  our regression analysis is motivated  by the following two
considerations.  First.  according to equation  (7) from Proposition  1, the equilibrium
wholesale price set  by the  manufacturer  has  an inverted  U-shape:  it  first increases
and then decreases in the cost of engaging in parallel importing.  In the context  of the
model, the tariff rate  in the home nation  of the manufacturer  is an ideal measure  of
this  cost because the manufacturer  is concerned with foreign wholesalers re-exporting
goods back to the source country.  Indeed, except for the theory  in this  paper,  there
seems to be no other reason why the foreign wholesale price set  by the manufacturer
should depend on the home tariff rate.
Second, a slight extension  of our model would show that  if the manufacturer  sells
its product through  several independent wholesalers in a foreign country, then compe-
tition  among those  wholesalers would enable the manufacturer  to raise its  wholesale
price without worsening the distortion arising from the double markup.  The manufac-
turer  would set a higher wholesale price in competitive markets,  which would reduce
25parallel imports  with  smaller distortion  in vertical pricing.  We test  this proposition
by regressing wholesale prices on a measure  of concentration  in wholesale trade  in
each export market.  We expect to find a negative coefficient.
A satisfactory  empirical environment  in which to test  our model is one in which a
single manufacturer  sets varying wholesale prices in different export markets.  For this
purpose,  we employ U.S. export  prices in 26 highly disaggregated  (10-digit Harmo-
nized  System classification) products  that  may be thought  subject  to  parallel trade.
We equate  wholesale prices in each export market  with  U.S.  export  unit  values to
each country.  Note  that  international  trade  prices should  adequately  reflect whole-
sale prices because substantial  amounts of trade  occur through  distributors.  In 1994,
for example, 46 percent  of U.S. intrafirm exports  over all industries  was shipped  to
foreign wholesalers." 5 We focus on two definitions  of wholesale price.  First,  export
prices themselves reflect pricing decisions at the U.S. border.  Second, we adjust  ex-
port  prices for the  costs of ad valorem  transport  costs and  tariffs in the  importing
nations.  These latter  prices reflect marginal costs as seen by local agents.
The export  unit value data  come from extensively disaggregated  commodity clas-
sifications, but  it is inevitable  that  the products  shipped to  various markets  are not
identical.  We control for this source of error in two ways. First,  we exclude from the
analysis any  country  for which the  export  price is greater  than  250 percent  of the
median  price or less than  40 percent  of the  median.  Such extreme prices invariably
reflected  small export  quantities.  Second, we include in the  regression the  number
of product  sub-categories  in each of our 10-digit categories.  This  variable provides
a control for product  heterogeneity  within each product  class.  The 26 categories we
use and the number of countries per category  are listed in the Appendix, Table 1.
We adopt  the following pair of regression equations:
wij, = at + 01Yj + 02H, + 03Cij + 34TU, + 35TUj2
'6Compiled  by the authors  from  Survey  of Current  Business,  February  1997.
26ej  =:  a + biYj + b2Hi + b3Ci 2 + b4TU, + b 5TUj2  + b6Tjj + b7rij
In the first  equation,  w is the wholesaler marginal cost for product  Z in importer
j.  In the second equation,  e is the U.S. export  price at the border.  These prices are
related  by  wij  =  eij(l  + Tij)(I  + -rij) where  T  indicates  the  ad  valorem tariff  rate
in the importing  nation  and  T  is the estimate  of percentage  transport  costs.  Thus,
in  the  first  equation  we explain  the  structure  of wholesaler marginal  costs  across
countries.  In the  second equation  we explain  the  structure  of export  prices set  by
the manufacturer  at the port  but control for the fact that  these prices would depend
negatively  on  import  tariffs  and  transport  costs to  the  extent  the  exporter  must
absorb some portion of these charges. Percentage transport  costs are estimated  from
differences in the bilateral values of U.S. imports from eachmarket,  measured with and
without  charges for cost, insurance,  and  freight  (CIF). The variable Y is per-capita
income in the  importing  country, which we hypothesize  has  a positive coefficient if
it reflects demand  size. The variable H is our measure of product  heterogeneity.  We
anticipate  its  sign to  be positive if more differentiated products  bear  higher prices.
Concentration  in  the  wholesale market  is captured  by C,  which is the  Herfindahl
index for wholesale trade  in each importing  country, disaggregated by corresponding
SIC category.  Again, we anticipate  the sign on C in both  equations  to  be negative.
Finally, TU is the U.S. ad valorem tariff rate.  Our theory predicts  a positive sign on
the linear term  and a negative sign on the quadratic  term  in both  equations.
In the regressions we also incorporate  regional dummy variables,  with regions de-
fined as the  European  Union, other Europe,  Canada,  Mexico and  Central  America,
South America,  East  Asia, and other  developing countries.  We exclude the  dummy
variable for the  EU, making it the reference case. There  are two reasons for includ-
ing the regional  slope dummies.  First,  we wish to  control for idiosyncratic  pricing
decisions associated with regions. Second, and of greater interest,  our model suggests
that  the exporting  manufacturer  would set a higher price in countries or regions that
27permit  parallel exports  back to the United  States.  In our country  sample, such ex-
ports  are prohibited  by the EU, other Europe, Canada,  and Mexico. Parallel trade  is
permitted  by most countries of East  Asia, including Japan,  and by most  developing
countries in other regions.
Sources for our data  are as follows. The export unit-value  data  and  CIF rates  for
1993 were taken  from CD-ROMS compiled by Feenstra  (1996, 1997).  The  number
of product  sub-categories  within each 10-digit HS category was taken  from the U.S.
National  TRade  Data Bank.  Tariff rates by HS product category were provided by the
World Bank.  Herfindahl indexes were calculated from firm-specific sales data  in each
country  (covering both  domestic  and  foreign-owned distributors),  available  from  a
private service called infoUSA. Herfindahl indexes could not be constructed  because of
missing data  in a number of product-country  pairs, primarily in developing countries.
Thus, we have two data samples, one including Herfindahl indexes (522 observations)
and  one  excluding  Herfindahl  indexes  (972 observations).  Correlation  coefficients
among the  key variables in the smaller sample are provided in the  Appendix,  Table
2.
Table  3 presents  our regression results,  performed with  ordinary least squares but
the  standard  errors  are adjusted  to  be  heteroskedastic-consistent. 16 The  first  two
columns use the  wholesaler marginal cost  as the  dependent  variable  and  the  third
and  fourth  columns use export  price.  In each pair,  the  first  equation  includes the
importer  Herfindahl  index in  wholesale distribution  while the  second  one excludes
it.  Thus,  the second equation  of each pair incorporates  more observations, primarily
from developing countries.  Consider first the  determination  of wholesaler mnarginal
costs, which incorporates  by construction  import tariffs and transport  costs. Our first
result  is that  GDP per  capita  exerts a negative influence on wolesale cost, which is
16Because  the list of products covers  goods with widely divergent  median unit prices, the presence
of heteroskedasticity is likely.
28surprising  in that  we would expect higher prices in markets with stronger  demand.  It
is conceivable that  a better  measure of demand would be aggregate market size. One
partial  explanation  for this puzzle may be seen from the coefficient on the Herfindahl
index.  As our  theory  predicts,  more concentrated  distribution  markets  experience
lower wholesale prices because U.S. manufacturers  have additional  power to  control
vertical pricing decisions and to deter parallel imports.  As the correlation table in the
Appendix  shows, there  is a strong negative correlation between GDP per capita  and
market  concentration.  However, when the Herfindahl index is excluded, the coefficient
on GDP per  capita  is cut in half and  becomes much less significant.  Thus,  without
conditioning  on local market  power of distributors,  the  marginal costs  of acquiring
U.S. manufactures  seems little affected by per-capita  income.
The  control  for product  heterogeneity  has  a positive  coefficient, as anticipated.
Thus, categories that  comprise more kinds of differentiated goods tend to have higher
wholesale prices, other things equal.
A key finding is that  the U.S. tariff rate,  a measurable  component  of the costs of
parallel-exporting  goods back from distributor  markets  abroad to the United  States,
operates  as predicted  by the theory.  Specifically, there  is an inverted  quadratic  re-
lationship  between wholesale marginal costs and the  U.S. tariff rate by product  cat-
egory.  Thus,  for products  with  low tariff rates,  U.S. exporters  set  foreign marginal
costs that  rise with  those  rates  in order  to  deter  re-imports  of parallel  goods.  But
for products  with high tariff rates, U.S. exporters set marginal costs that  fall as tariff
charges increase.  Again,  it is difficult to find reason outside  our model why foreign
prices should  depend systematically on domestic tariff rates
Most of the regional dummy variables are insignificant, suggesting that there is little
systematic variation in price behavior relative to the prices set in the European  Union.
The  major  exception  is that  prices in East  Asia are significantly higher than  those
in other regions  of the world.  Except  for Japan,  these  countries have lower average
29incomes than  those  in the EU, so this  difference seems unlikely to be due to  demand
elasticity.  Some of the difference evidently reflects higher tariffs and transport  charges,
because the  coefficients are somewhat smaller in the third  and fourth  columns where
the  focus is strictly  on export  prices.  However, those  differences remain  statistically
significant  and  large.  Within  the context  of our model, this  result  is consistent  with
the need of U.S. manufacturers  to set high wholesale distribution  prices in East  Asian
economies in order  to  preclude  parallel exporting  back to  the  United  States.  These
countries  generally permit  such exports  and are frequently  the subject  of complaints
from U.S. manufacturers  in this  regard.
Turning  to  the  export-price  regressions  we again  find that  local  market  concen-
tration  significantly  reduces the  export  prices set  at  the  U.S.  border  by American
manufacturers.  This  is entirely  consistent  with  our vertical-control  approach  to  the
sources of parallel  trade.  Further,  the  U.S. tariff rate  continues  to  be significant  in
both  its linear  and quadratic  terms.  Tariff rates  in the importing  country  and trans-
port  costs  to  move products  there  have  a significantly  negative  impact  on  export
prices, suggesting  that  U.S. exporting  firms absorb some component  of those  costs.
Finally,  only the East  Asian dummy variable is significant and its positive sign again
provides indirect  support  for our theory.  (See Table 3.)
5.  Conclusion
This  paper  has  reviewed the  debates  and  the  international  policy  structure  con-
cerning parallel  imports  and  has offered a theory  of parallel  imports  as it relates  to
vertical  price control.  We find that  while the  possibility  of parallel  imports  can in-
crease retail-market  competition,  it can also affect a marnufacturer  or rights  owner's
incentive  in setting  the  wholesale price it charges a  distributor  and  reduce vertical
pricing  efficiency.  There  exists  a U-shaped  welfare curve of parallel  trade  with  re-
spect  to  trade  cost,  and  parallel  trade  is more  likely to  increase  welfare  within  a
30region than  in  the  entire  world trading  system.  Existing  and  additional  empirical
evidence supports  the view that  there  are multiple causes for parallel imports.  While
these  theories  differ in their  precise policy implications,  they  all appear  to  suggest
that  some restrictions  on parallel imports,  especially between countries with very dif-
ferent  demands  or high trade  costs,  would be desirable.  Our  analysis  also suggests
a need to  coordinate  international  policy towards  parallel  imports  with  other trade
policies.
Our  econometric  analysis  of prices  suggests  that  our  theoretical  explanation  of
parallel  imports  is relevant  and  conceivably a significant element  of global trade.  It
also supports  the importance  of the theoretical  analysis for the policy debates  about
parallel  imports.  For example,  our  analysis suggests  that  given any two  countries,
there  exists  some critical  value of trade  costs such that  parallel  trade  increases  (or
decreases) global welfare when the cost of engaging it is below (or above) the critical
value.  Pricing behavior by U.S. exporters  in the face of low American tariffs suggests
that  they increase export prices in an attempt  to deter parallel trade.  But in the pres-
ence of low trade  costs our analysis suggests that  allowing parallel imports  is likely to
increase welfare.  This may be particularly  true within a region, such as the Euopean
Union  or  NAFTA.  However, restricting  parallel  imports  may  be  desirable  between
countries involving significant trade  costs.  Interestingly, Malueg and Schwartz (1994)
offer a similar  policy implication,  although  for a different reason.
To the extent  that  parallel imports may allow one distributor  to free ride on another
distributor's  promotional  activities  and reduce efficiency of promotional  activities,  a
case  may  be  made  for the  prevention  of parallel  imports.  Our  analysis  suggests
that  there  need not  be  externalities  of this  type  in order  to  have welfare-improving
restrictions  on  parallel  imports.  The  need to  achieve vertical  price efficiency by  a
manufacturer  can make  it  desirable  to  prevent  parallel  imports.  Recently, concern
about  parallel  trade  has  surfaced in pharmaceuticals  and  biotechnology,  on the  one
31hand,  and  the  copyright  industries  including software, recorded music, videos,  and
book publishing,  on the other.  These sectors  are characterized  by high R&D costs
but  low marginal costs of production  and distribution.  Thus, the differences between
retail  prices and  marginal costs for these products  are often significant.  Our theory
may prove to be particularly  useful in these situations.
There are a number of possible extensions of the model and its interpretations.  We
could allow general demand functions in both  countries.  Explicit solutions would not
be possible in general, but  the insights of the paper would not be changed. Again, the
manufacturer  would face the tradeoff between achieving vertical pricing efficiency and
preventing  parallel  imports.  We could also imagine retailers  incurring  fixed selling
costs in each country.  In the presence of selling costs, parallel imports  may cause a
manufacturer  to  refrain from selling in a particular  country  at all.  Thus,  such costs
would make restricting  parallel imports  more likely to increase the  combined social
surplus  in two  countries.  Clearly, such  extensions  would increase  the  complexity
of the processes underlying parallel imports  and would call for additional  empirical
analysis.
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35Table 1. Summary of IPR Exhaustion  Regimes
Country  Trademarks  Patents  Copyrights
EU  Community Exhaustion  Community Exhaustion  Community Exhaustion
US  National Exhaustion limited by  National Exhaustion  National Exhaustion
common control and no
consumer confusion
Japan  International Exhaustion  Same as Trademarks  International Exhaustion
unless agreed by contract or  except for motion pictures
original sale is price-controlled
Australia  International Exhaustion  National Exhaustion unless  National Exhaustion
ON  sold by patent owner without  except for compact disks
clear restrictions  and books
Sources: NERA (1999) and International Intellectual Property website, 1998.Table 2. Survey Estimates of Parallel Imports  Within the European  Union
Additional PI with
Sector  Estimate  Unilateral Exhaustion  Likely Sources
Footwear and leather goods  < 5%  5%  SE Asia
Musical recordings  10-20%  4%  US, Japan, SE Asia
Automobiles  < 5%  < 5%  Japan
Consumer electronics  5%  10%  Japan, East Asia
Domestic appliances  < 5%  8%  US
Cosmetics and perfumes  up to 13%  <5%  US
Clothing  5-10%  1.50%  SE Asia, US
Soft drinks  upto  15%  <5%  na
Confectionery  < 10%  5%  US
Alcoholic drinks  <5%  Negligible  na
Source: NERA (1999)Table 3.  Estimation of Vertical-Pricing Model
Variable  Wholesaler MC  Wholesaler MC  Export Price  Export Price
Constant  -339.5  -3411  51.5  -2405
(-0.19)  (-2.49)  (0.03)  (-2.10)
GDPPC  -0.249  -0.13  -0.17  -0.09
(-2.60)  (-1.64)  (-2.13)  (-1.36)
Heterogeneity  4244  3814  3200  2970
(9.28)  (10.67)  (9.49)  (10.85)
Herfindahl  -4104  -3555
(-3.70)  (-3.98)
US Tariff  354161  381567  329115  332717
(7.11)  (12.29)  (7.36)  (12.00)
US Tariff Sq  -0.56e+7  -0.59e+7  -0.53e+7  -0.52e+7
(-7.32)  (-12.19)  (-7.64)  (-11.96)
Importer Tariff  -3960  -3622
(-2.26)  (-2.57)
Transport Cost  -3682  -1488
(-2.33)  (-1.48)
Europe Other  -476.4  -1396  -474.4  -1337
(-0.52)  (-1.64)  (-0.59)  (-1.74)
Canada  -279.1  13.1  -583.9  -167.6
(-0.22)  (0.01)  (-0.51)  (-0.15)
Mex/Central Am  -953.3  -2418  -279.9  -1779
(-0.54)  (-2.08)  (-0.19)  (-1.90)
South America  -72.6  -1387  -31.0  -1170
(-0.04)  (-1.25)  (-0.02)  (-1.33)
East Asia  3676  1920  2978  1334
(3.41)  (2.25)  (3.19)  (1.78)
Other Developing  -1610  -1924  -1079  -1448
(-0.94)  (-1.45)  (-0.80)  (-1.40)
Sample size  522  972  522  972
Adjusted R2  0.29  0.26  0.26  0.24
F  20.3  35.7  14.8  27.2
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent.
38Appendix Table 1. Products Used in the Regression Analysis
HS number  Product  Number of Countries
2208306020  Bourbon whiskies  43
2208309020  Whiskies except bourbon  32
4901910020  Dictionaries  23
4901990075  Rack size paperbacks  48
4902902040  Business periodicals  38
8414400000  Air compressors 1  32
8414801018  Air compressors 2  24
8414801042  Air compressors 3  35
8414801067  Air compressors 4  36
8414801075  Air compressors 5  27
8414801080  Air compressors 6  29
8415100040  Air conditioners 1  50
8415100060  Air conditioners 2  54
8415100080  Air conditioners 3  50
8415810010  Air conditioners 4  41
8415810030  Air conditioners 5  39
8415820005  Air conditioners 6  35
8415820010  Air conditioners 7  33
8415820015  Air conditioners 8  35
8524904040  Laser disk sound recordings  49
8528104000  Video recorders  37
8528108005  Color televisions  31
8703240050  4-cylinder automobiles  31
8703240060  6-cylinder automobiles  53
8711500000  Motorcycles  40
900653000  Professional photo cameras  27
Appendix Table 2: Correlations among Variables
wprice  eprice  gdppc  het  herf  ustar  tariff  transport
wprice  1.00
eprice  0.97  1.00
gdppc  -0.16  -0.09  1.00
het  0.46  0.43  -0.05  1.00
herf  -0.06  -0.11  -0.34  -0.07  1.00
ustar  0.13  0.14  -0.05  0.04  -0.09  1.00
tariff  0.27  0.16  -0.51  0.23  0.27  0.14  1.00
transport  -0.11  -0.14  -0.00  -0.16  0.15  -0.18  -0.02  1.00
Notes: wprice is wholesaler marginal cost, eprice is export price, gdppc is GDP per capita, het is
the measure of product heterogeneity, herf is the Herfindahl index, ustar is the U.S. tariff rate,
tariff is the tariff rate in the importing country, and transport is percentage transport costs from
the U.S. to the importing country. Sample size for these correlations is 522.
39g  g=(13-8a)/6
g=O.5  g = (3/14)a
Pa  < Pb  Pa  >'  Pb
g=O 
a =1  a=2  a
Figure 1: Parallel Imports and Trading Costs
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